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CIVIL RIGHTS: AN EXAMINATION OF NON-SYMPTOMATIC
HIV INFECTION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)
I. FACTS
In 1986, Sidney Abbott became infected with the Human Immune
Deficiency Virus (HIV), the virus which causes Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).1 On September 16, 1994, Abbott sought
a dental examination from Dr. Randon Bragdon, a board-certified den-
tist in Bangor, Maine. 2 Before the examination, Abbott acknowledged
on a patient release form that she was infected with HIV but stated that
was not yet suffering from AIDS and its most dramatic effects. 3
During the examination, Bragdon discovered that Abbott had a
cavity. 4 Bragdon then informed Abbott he would only fill her cavity in
a hospital setting. 5 Furthermore, he informed her that while he would
charge her his regular fee, she would be responsible for any additional
costs due to the hospital visit. 6 As support for this decision, Bragdon
told Abbott that his infectious disease policy required him to take such
precautions. 7 Abbott refused to accept the condition that she be treated
in a hospital setting.8 She then filed a complaint against Bragdon under
the Maine Human Rights Act 9 and Title III of the Americans with
1. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2200 (1998).
2. See id. at 2201.
3. See id. At later stages, Human Immune-deficiency Virus (hereinafter HIV) infection results
in outwardly noticeable clinical features such as lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral
lesions and bacterial infections, with later clinical conditions such as pneumocystis carninii pneumonia,
Kaposi's sarcoma and non-Hodgkins lymphoma. See id. at 2204. Other outward signs of HIV infec-
tion include persistent general systematic disorders, such as fever, weight loss, fatigue, lesions, nausea,
and diarrhea. Id.
4. See id. at 2201.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. It is not clear whether the routine policy that Bragdon claimed prevented his in-office
treatment of Abbott was a formal written policy. See id.
8. See id.
9. See 5 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592 (West 1989). As the First Circuit Court of Appeals
stated: "Interpretation of both the ADA and the [Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA)] have 'proceed-
ed hand in hand without distinction."' Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1997).
Therefore, because the claims are essentially the same, the court did not discuss the MHRA further.
Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997). While this appears to be the most likely
scenario when ADA claims are brought in states with human rights provisions, although decisions may
vary depending on the individual state's interpretation of its respective laws. Cf id. (standing for the
proposition that state human rights statutes may be interpreted differently than the ADA). In North
Dakota, an individual who suffers a denial of public services, as Abbott did, would be able to seek a
state remedy under the North Dakota Human Rights Act (NDHRA). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-
15 (1997). The NDHRA expressly prohibits a public service provider from discriminating against an
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Disabilities Act (ADA),I0 alleging that he had discriminated against her
because of her HIV condition.ll
After Abbott's initial filing, the United States Government and the
Maine Human Rights Commission intervened as plaintiffs; both filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. 12 The United States District
Court of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of'Abbott, finding
that Bragdon violated the ADA by refusing to treat Abbott in his
office.13  In reaching this decision, the court found that Ms. Abbott
established that her asymptomatic1 4 HIV infection substantially limited
her major life activity of reproduction, and it therefore held, as a matter
of law, that Abbott was disabled under the ADA. 15 Furthermore, the
court held that treating HIV-positive patients like Abbott in a dental
office posed no direct threat to the health and safety of others. 16
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
summary judgment, holding Abbott's HIV infection to be a physical
impairment under Title III of the ADA.17 The court also agreed that
reproduction was a major life activity which would be substantially
limited by the disease, bringing the case under the rubric of the ADA.18
individual because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, marital status, status as to public
assistance, mental or physical disability. See id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has thus far
construed the NDHRA in a manner consistent with federal court interpretation of federal anti-discrimi-
nation legislation where such federal legislation is analogous. See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus,
116 F.3d 310, 314 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that it is the practice of the court to defer to federal court
interpretations where analogous statutes are at issue). This deference to analogous federal law seems
to indicate that the North Dakota Supreme Court would interpret the NDHRA to include protections
for asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals who qualify as disabled. Cf. id. (standing for the
proposition that it is likely the North Dakota Supreme Court would follow Abbott and construe the
NDHRA analogously with the ADA with regards to state claims by HIV-infected persons).
10. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C § 12182(a) (1994). This provision of the
Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter "ADA") states that a place of public accommodation
may not discriminate against an individual on the basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
services. See id. However, a disabled individual who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others may be denied services. See ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(3) (1994).
11. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
12. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995).
13. See id. at 595.
14. See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICnONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 129 (2d.
ed. 1996) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTONARY] (defining "asymptomatic"
as "showing no evidence of disease").
15. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 587.
16. See id. at 589. Bragdon failed to present evidence that would allow him to overcome the
summary judgment motion; he essentially asked the court to "infer a significant risk from a
combination of his conjecture as to potential transmission and statistics which at best may place health
care workers at a higher risk of contracting HIV." Id. at 588-89. The court found Bragdon's
argument that dental health care workers faced a risk of infection because of the potential for needle
stick and the exposure to the spattering of blood and bloody saliva carried little weight. See id. at 588.
Furthermore, the court found the statistics cited by Bragdon unconvincing since there was no
documented case of a dentist suffering from an occupational transmission. See id.




The court also found that Ms. Abbott's condition did not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of Bragdon.19 The court further
found that Bragdon "failed to present meaningful probative evidence
that treating Abbott would have posed a medically significant risk to his
health or safety." 20 Therefore, the court held that as of September 1994,
treating HIV-positive patients in an office environment posed no direct
threat to Bragdon's health or safety because there was no public
healthcare authority indicating otherwise.21
Bragdon appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 22 The
Supreme Court affirmed the two lower courts' holdings and found that
asymptomatic HIV infection was a disability that significantly limited
Abbott's ability to engage in the major life activity of reproduction. 23
However, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the First Circuit on
the issue of whether Abbott posed a direct threat to the health and safety
of Bragdon or others. 24 On remand, the First Circuit affirmed its origi-
nal holding, concluding that treating Abbott in a regular office setting
did not pose a direct threat to others.25
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress created the ADA in response to demands from disabled
individuals who had previously been restricted from enjoying common
rights of society. 26 While earlier federal legislation attempted to remedy
the day-to-day problems faced by the disabled, the ADA was the first
legislation to reach into non-governmental enterprises and provide a
framework to remedy disability discrimination. 27 The findings and
purposes section of the ADA clearly states the problems Congress
drafted the legislation to address:
Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
19. See id. at 948-49.
20. Id.
21. See id. The court specified September 1994 because Bragdon's actions were fairly evalu-
ated from the standpoint of medical knowledge available when he refused service to Abbott. See id.
22. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2196 (1998).
23. See id. at 2207.
24. See id at 2213.
25. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998).
26. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the
New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MEo. 7. 21 (1997).
27. See Reed L. Russell, Arguing for More Principled Decision Making in Deciding Whether an
Individual Is Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity of Working Under the ADA, 47 CA'm. U. L.
REV. 1057, 1057 (1998) (noting that while section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act used the same
framework to analyze claims in federally funded entities, the ADA extended the framework to
non-federally funded enterprises).
1999]
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position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society. 28
The following discussion reviews the development of the ADA from
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The discussion also summarizes the
treatment of HIV and AIDS under both acts.
A. EVOLUTION OF THE ADA FROM THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
In 1990, President George Bush signed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) into law. 29 The ADA was generally viewed as an expan-
sion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.30 While the Rehabilitation Act
prohibited discrimination against disabled individuals participating in
federally-funded public sector programs or activities, the ADA extended
protection to disabled individuals in the private sector.3 1 The broad goal
of the ADA was to end discrimination in non-federally funded entities
against individuals with disabilities in employment, public services and
public accommodations. 32
28. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). Id. It is highly likely that this language referring
to "discrete and insular minorities" was taken from Justice Harlan Stone's famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
This often-cited language asks "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
inquiry," and it seems to capture the spirit of the ADA. Id.
29. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
30. See Russell, supra note 27, at 1057 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
31. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,793-94 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also Rus-
sell, supra note 27, at 1057. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, amended in 1974, prohibits disability dis-
crimination by any organization receiving federal money or by any executive agency against any
federal employee or employees of federal contractors. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-94. The ADA
extended this protection against discrimination to private actors who do not directly receive federal
funds. See Russell, supra note 27, at 1057 (noting that the ADA "extends to the private sector the
scope of protection for disabled persons originally provided to federally funded programs or activities
by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"). The ADA has three different Titles: Title I protects the disabled
from discrimination in employment, Title II protects the disabled from denial of public services, and
Title III prohibits discrimination through denial of public accommodations and services provided by
private entities. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12189 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
32. See generally ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). The stated purpose of the ADA is:
(1) to provide clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards established in this Chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
612
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The Rehabilitation Act sought to prevent discrimination against
disabled individuals, who the Act refers to as "handicapped," 33 by
prohibiting discrimination against such individuals receiving federal
assistance. 34 The Rehabilitation Act defines a person as handicapped if
he or she qualifies under any of the Act's three prongs. 35 Thus, an
individual is handicapped if he or she "(i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 36 Scholars suggested as early
as 1985 that this definition extended protection to HIV-infected
individuals. 37
Id.
33. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 12.
34. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). This section of the statute
provides in part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in
section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability. be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any




36. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994) (providing the definition of "individual with a disability").
See also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 12. The Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped
individual" and the ADA's definition of "individual with a disability" are the same, since the later
evolved from the former. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 829 (4th ed. 1997). Therefore, the following definitions apply to both pieces of
legislation. The term "physical or mental impairment" is defined by the Department of Health and
Human Services, the agency which issues regulations for implementing the ADA, as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary; hemoic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1998). The term "substantially limits," in reference to the impairment
claimed by an individual and its affect on a major life activity, is defined as "[Slignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular life activity
as compared to the average person in the general population." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)-(ii)
(1998). Furthermore, factors that should be considered in making this evaluation include: "i) The
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and iii)
the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting
from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (1998). Such major life activities recognized by the
ADA include caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working although this is not in exhaustion list of all such major life activities.
See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1998).
37. See Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 681, 691 (1985); see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 12.
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B. HIV AND AIDS UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT
In a 1985 publication, Arthur Leonard proposed two primary argu-
ments in support of his theory that the Rehabilitation Act should protect
individuals with AIDS or HIV from discrimination in employment.3 S
The first argument focused on the infected individual's inability to fight
infection and thereby preserve his or her health. 39 Leonard posited that
the inability to fight infection came within the first prong of the
Rehabilitation Act, since it substantially limited major life activities. 40
Second, Leonard argued that both symptomatic and asymptomatic indi-
viduals qualified as disabled under the third prong of the Rehabilitation
Act, because both were regarded as having impairment on a major life
activity. 41 Under this theory, asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals
were disabled because "irrational fears and animosity toward individuals
with a physical condition could cause the limitation of a major life
activity." 42 However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1986 exposed
several shortcomings in Leonard's arguments. 43
In June of 1986, Charles Cooper of the DOJ's Office of Legal
Counsel issued a memorandum proffering the position that the Rehabili-
tation Act protected individuals with full-blown AIDS but offered no
similar protection to individuals with asymptomatic HIV.44 The memo-
randum stated that asymptonatic HIV-infected individuals did not suffer
from a physical impairment. 45  Alternatively, the DOJ argued that if
38. Leonard, supra note 37, at 691.
39. Leonard, supra note 37, at 691.
40. See Leonard, supra note 37, at 691; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 13. The
first prong of the disability definition is triggered if an individual has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities. See Parmet & Jackson, supra
note 26, at 12. The major life activities that Leonard believed were limited apparently included those
of caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working, as Leonard was apparently relying on that fact that such individuals were sick.
See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 14. These activities appeared in the implementing regulations
for the Rehabilitation Act. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 14.
41. See Leonard, supra note 37, at 691; see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
706(8)(B) (1994).
42. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 13-14.
43. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 13-14. (showing that Leonard's theory had some
shortcomings in that: 1) discrimination against individuals with AIDS/HIV might have occurred be-
cause of social stereotypes; 2) individuals regarded with dislike because of infection might not qualify
under specific statutory language as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity; and 3) the ability to fight infection may not have qualified as a major life activity when
considered in context with the representative life activities listed in the implementation regulations for
the Rehabilitation Act).
44. See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-1 (June 25, 1986)
[hereinafter Cooper Memorandum]; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 14.
45. See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 44, at D-1. This DOJ memorandum noted that even
though society may choose not to associate with an individual with a contagious disease, it cannot be
614 [VOL. 75:609
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HIV-infected individuals were physically impaired, such an impairment
did not substantially limit a major life activ ity, 46 thereby removing them
from the protection of the Rehabilitation Act.
47
Shortly after DOJ issued its 1986 opinion, the Supreme Court heard
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline4 8 in which a schoolteacher
claimed a violation of the Rehabilitation Act by her former employer
school board. 49 The teacher alleged that she was terminated because of
her chronic relapsing tuberculosis. 50 The Court found the plaintiff to be
handicapped under the Act because she had a record of impairment for
repeated hospitalizations that substantially limited several of the major
life activities recognized by the statute.5 1 Thus, the Court held that a
person suffering from the contagious disease of tuberculosis could be
classified as handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
52
The Court further suggested that the "regarded as having a disability"
prong of the Rehabilitation Act should include any disease that carried a
high degree of negative social stigma.53
The Arline Court also considered when an otherwise-qualified
handicapped person could be denied employment because his or her
condition posed significant health and safety risks to others that could
not be eliminated by reasonable accommodations. 54 The Court held that
said that such an individual is handicapped, because doing so would mean many unpleasant handicaps
would automatically be classified as disabilities. See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 44, at D-1.
46. See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 44, at D-1; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26,
at 14.
47. See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 44, at D-1; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26,
at 14.
48. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
49. See generally School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) (holding that
a person with a contagious disease such as tuberculosis was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973).
50. See id. at 276.
51. See id. at 281. The Court defined major life activities under the Rehabilitation Act as "func-
tions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Id. at 280. Furthermore, the Court held that Arline's repeated
hospitalization was "a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities
were substantially limited by her impairment." Id; see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1994).
52. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
53. See id; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 15 (theorizing that Justice Brennan was
thinking of HIV-infected individuals when, in dicta, he stated that "society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment") (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 281).
54. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Court remanded the case to determine if Arline was other-
wise qualified for her job. See id. The Court went on to note that to prevail in an employment discrimi-
nation claim, a party must prove that he or she was otherwise qualified for the position or could be
qualified with a reasonable accommodation. See id. at 286 n.15. "In the employment context, an
otherwise qualified person is one who can perform 'the essential functions' of the job in question." Id.
at 288 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)). Furthermore, "When a handicapped person is not able
to perform the essential functions of the job, the Court must also consider whether any 'reasonable
accommodations' by the employer would enable the handicapped person to perform those functions."
Id. An accommodation is considered unreasonable if it imposes an undue financial and administrative
burden on an employer or alters the fundamental nature of the job. See id.
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such a denial of services or employment is permissible if a handicapped
person threatens the health or safety of others.55 Language derived from
this decision was subsequently incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act
and later into the ADA, eventually coming to be known as the "direct
threat" provision. 56 The Court stated that employees should defer to
the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials when
determining the risk a handicapped person poses to the health or safety
of others. 57 The Arline decision was groundbreaking, and it caused
the DOJ to reconsider whether HIV-infected individuals who were
asymptomatic qualified as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.58
After Arline, a few courts recognized that HIV-infected persons
were significantly limited in the major life activity of reproduction. 59
For example, courts in Doe v. Dolton Elementary School District No.
14860 and Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District61 had no dif-
ficulty in finding that children suffering discrimination as a result of
HIV infection were disabled as a matter of law.62 Apparently, the courts
were able to overlook some of the negative social stigmas associated with
AIDS and HIV because the children appeared to be blameless for their
condition. 63 Additionally, the court in Dolton Elementary noted that
while the child in the case did not yet have a functioning reproductive
system, the prospect of future limitation constituted a disability.64
55. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); see also ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)
(1994). This subsection of the ADA defines direct threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id.
56. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Arline Court defined the consideration of the risk, in the
employment context, of a person handicapped by a contagious disease to be
based on reasonable medical judgements given the state of medical knowledge, about (a)
the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how
long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to
third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm.
Id.
57. See id.
58. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 15.
59. See Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See also generally
Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 19.
60. 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1988).
61. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
62. See Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see
also Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See also
generally Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 19. In reaching this conclusion, these courts noted that
the children had "abnormalities in their hemic and reproductive systems making procreation and child
birth dangerous to themselves and others." Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 19. Furthermore, the
Dolton Elementary court noted, "The AIDS victim has a disorder of the reproductive system in that he
or she cannot engage in reproductive activity without endangering the lives of both the offspring and
the other parent." See Dolton Elementary, 694 F. Supp at 444.
63. See generally Dolton Elementary, 694 F. Supp. at 440; Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 376.
64. See Dolton Elementary, 694 F. Supp at 445. "While the (s]tudent may not yet be of an age
616
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In 1988, the DOJ reevaluated its 1986 memorandum and adopted
the position that asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals were covered by
the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicapped. 65 The DOJ deter-
mined that because of the physiological impact of HIV infection, even
asymptomatic infected individuals qualified for coverage. 66 However,
the DOJ noted that an asymptomatic individual would still have to meet
the "substantially limited in a major life activity" requirement of the
Act to be classified as handicapped. 67 The DOJ explained that meeting
this requirement was possible, since HIV infection has a substantially
limiting effect on the ability of infected individuals to reproduce or
conduct intimate relations. 68
After this second memorandum, many state and federal courts held
that HIV infection, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, was a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act.69 Further, "Every reported decision from
the mid-1980s up until the passage of the ADA in 1990 determined that
both AIDS and, when presented, asymptomatic HIV infection constituted
disabilities within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act or similar state
statutes." 70 However, most courts avoided the DOJ's focus on the
physiological impact of HIV infection and its interpretation of the
where such [reproductive] activity is appropriate, the mere prospect of such a limitation is certain to
restrict social interaction with those of the opposite sex." Id.
65. See Memorandum to Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Justice Department Memorandum on Applica-
tion of Rehabilitation Act's Section to HIV Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-I
(Oct. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Culvahouse Memorandum]; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at
15-16.
66. See Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65, at D-1. The physiological impact the DOJ
referenced arose from the fact that a majority of asymptomatic HIV-infected persons suffer from
immune system abnormalities. See Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65, at D-1; see also Parmet
& Jackson, supra note 26, at 16.
67. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16. The DOJ did acknowledge Justice Brennan's
comments in Arline that he believed acts of discrimination could serve to limit major life activities
substantially. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16.
68. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16. The DOJ noted that since the list of major life
activities included in the Rehabilitation Act was only representative, it was possible that courts could
interpret the list to contain other affected matters. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16.
69. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 17 n.79. (citing Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840
F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. I11. 1989); Doe v. Dolton
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV
87-2514 PAR (PX), 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988); Robertson v. Granite City Community
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. I11. 1988); Martinez v. School Bd., 675 F. Supp. 1574
(M.D. Fla. 1987); Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. I11. 1987); Ray v. School
Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist.,
662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of State,
662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 261
Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 N.J. Super. 174 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1987); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Ed. of New
York, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)); see also Association of Relatives and Friends
of AIDS Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D. Puerto Rico 1990); Cain
v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
70. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16-17.
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Rehabilitation Act's statutory language. 71 Rather, because these cases
generally dealt with children who were infected with HIV or who were
suffering from AIDS, courts were able to avoid the issues of social
stigma related to HIV and AIDS.72 However, these cases served to lay
the groundwork for later amendments to the Rehabilitation Act and
judicial interpretation of the ADA.73
In 1988, the Civil Rights Restoration Act amended the Rehabili-
tation Act.74 This amendment introduced direct threat language very
similar to that found in the Arline decision. 75 The language of the
amendment excluded from Rehabilitation Act coverage those individuals
suffering from a contagious disease and who either posed a threat to the
health or safety of others or were not able to perform the required job
functions. 76 While the amendment did not specifically mention HIV
infection, scholars have inferred that if HIV-infection did not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others, it should still be considered
a disability. 77
C. HIV AND AIDS UNDER THE ADA
The 1990 ADA provided protection for disabled individuals in the
private sector that the Rehabilitation Act provided for similarly-situated
individuals in federally-funded programs. 78 Though it borrowed heavily
from the language of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA specifically pro-
tected disabled Americans from discrimination in the private sector while
in the work place, while receiving public services, and while accessing
public accommodations. 79
71. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16.
72. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 17 n.79; see also supra note 69.
73. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 16-20 (showing that early HIV cases brought under
the Rehabilitation Act resulted in amendments to the statute).
74. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994)); see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 20.
75. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. See also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994). The amendments specifically read that "the term ['handi-
cap'] does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by
reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of other
individuals or who, by reason of the current contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the
duties of the job." Id. See also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 20.
77. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 20. Scholars have rationalized the logic of Congress
in the amendment by pointing out "if HIV was not a disability, why limit the definition to those cases
where an individual would not 'constitute a direct threat to the health or safety' of others due to their
infectious disease?" Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 20.
78. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994); see also Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking
Protected Class: Redefining the Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 107, 110 (1997).
79. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994). Even though much of the ADA relates to
employment discrimination in the private sector, it also protects the disabled from discrimination in
places of public accommodation. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This subsection reads:
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Under the ADA, discrimination that prevents a disabled person from
enjoying the services of any place of public accommodation is illegal.
8 0
However, no place of public accommodation is prohibited from exclud-
ing a disabled person if the person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others.8 1 Furthermore, the ADA states that since it drew its
definition of disability directly from the Rehabilitation Act, no provision
contained within it, or regulation issued pursuant to it, shall be construed
as applying a lesser standard.82 Therefore, the ADA grants at least as
much protection as the Rehabilitation Act.83
Prior to Bragdon v. Abbott,84 some federal courts refused to find
HIV infection a disability under the ADA.85 There are two methods by
which a court could do so: It could find either that asymptomatic HIV
infection was not a disability that caused an impairment of a major life
activity8 6 or, alternatively, that reproduction was not a major life activity
under the ADA.87 The following discussion reviews a leading case for
each proposition.
The first option is seen in Runnebaum v. Nations Bank,88 an employ-
ment case under Title I of the ADA.89 In Runnebaum, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether asymptomatic HIV infection
was an impairment under the ADA.90 The court found the infection
could not be a disability because it did not have a diminishing effect on
the plaintiff.91 However, the court noted that the ADA requires an in-
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation." Id.
80. See id.
81. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). This subsection reads:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in
or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommoda-
tions of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others. The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services.
Id.
82. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
83. See id. Furthermore, the ADA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title." Id.
84. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
85. See generally Elizabeth A. Crawford, Comment, The Courts' Interpretations of a Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Are They Keeping Our Promise to the Disabled?, 35 Hous.
L. REv. 1207, 1257 (1998) (standing for the proposition that federal courts have varied widely in
defining the protection provided HIV-infected individuals under the ADA).
86. See Runnebaum v. Nations Bank, 123 F.3d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1997).
87. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996).
88. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Crawford, supra note 85, at 1258.
89. See Runnebaum v. Nations Bank, 123 F.3d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1997).
90. See id. at 167.
91. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court defined "impairment" as a "decrease in
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dividualized assessment when defining what constitutes an impairment,
and its holding was similarly limited to the plaintiff before the court.9 2
While the court found the plaintiff did not have an impairment
under the ADA, it further found that, even if his condition was an
impairment, he could not show that it substantially limited a major life
activity. 93 The court noted that the ADA was intended to cover only
individuals whose most important major life activities were substantially
impaired and concluded that only major life activities referenced by the
ADA or related administrative provisions should be considered without
an individualized assessment as to whether an activity is important to an
individual plaintiff.94 While the court discussed issues of reproduction
and sexual relations, it refused to rule as to whether either activity was a
major life activity. 95 However, the court did note that the disease does
not prohibit individuals from reproducing or engaging in intimate
sexual relations.9 6 This was supported by the court's reasoning that it
was not the disease that limited the activities, but rather the infected
person's reaction and knowledge about the disease. 97 The court,
therefore, required that there be a causal connection between the
physical impairment and the major life activity.98
The second analysis by which asymptomatic HIV claims could be
rejected is seen in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,99 in which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the context of an infertility claim
that did not involve HIV infection, held that reproduction did not
constitute a major life activity.' 00 While there was no dispute as to
whether the plaintiff's inability to reproduce was an impairment, the
court found that this impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity as required by the ADA.I01 ' The Krauel court was able to reach
strength, value, amount, or quality." See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1258. Furthermore, the court
stated that to extend the ADA's coverage to "a nondiminishing nonimpairment would be contrary to
Congress's intent." Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 167.
92. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1259 (citing Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio,
Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995)).
93. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170. In defining what constituted a "major" life activity, the
Runnebaum court defined "major" to mean "[d]emanding great attention or concern" and "greater in
dignity, rank, importance, or interest." See id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW RIVERSIDE UNiVERsrry Dic'roN-
ARY 10 (1986)). However, in keeping with its individualized analysis in defining a major life activity,
the court noted that while working is listed by the ADA, there was no indication that working was
significant to Runnebaum. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 170-71; see also Crawford, supra note 85, at 1259-60.
96. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1260.
97. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1260.
98. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1260.
99. See 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff claimed that her infertility "substantially limited
her ability to reproduce naturally and to care for others." See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1260.
100. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996).
101. See id. As defined under the ADA, major life activities include "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1998).
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this conclusion despite the fact that the ADA references the reproductive
system as a body system that, if impaired, may constitute a physical
impairment.102 The court supported this conclusion by noting that the
terms "impairment" and "major life activity" were distinct parts of the
definition of a disability.103 Therefore, even though the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the plaintiff's inability to reproduce to be an
impairment, the impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity, meaning she was not disabled for ADA purposes. 104
As the holdings in Runnebaum and Krauel show, some courts
appeared unwilling to find either that asymptomatic HIV infection was a
disability that caused an impairment of a major life activity or that
reproduction constituted a major life activity under the ADA at all. 105
While both cases arose under the Title I employment section of the ADA,
the standards they announced also applied to the public services
provisions of Title 111.106
In conclusion, while the ADA has its foundational basis in the
Rehabilitation Act, it addresses disability discrimination issues not
covered by the earlier legislation.107 Further, because much of the
ADA's language was taken from the Rehabilitation Act, many cases
brought under the ADA rely on Rehabilitation Act case law and statutory
interpretation.l 0 8 However, because of its relatively short history, the fact
that the ADA extended discrimination coverage to the private sector, and
the relative recentness of HIV litigation, many of the HIV issues ad-
dressed by courts under the ADA are matters of first impression. 109
Such was the case with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bragdon,
a denial of services case brought under the ADA. 10
III. CASE ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, affirmed part of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the judgment and remanded
102. See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677.
103. See id. The court noted that the terms are "'separate and distinct' components of the
ADA's definition of disability." Id.
104. See id.
105. See id.; see also Runnebaum v. Nations Bank, 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir. 1997).
106. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1256-57.
107. See generally Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 17-21 (standing for the proposition that
the ADA addresses disability discrimination to a broader degree because it reached into the private
sector).
108. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 17-21.
109. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 26, at 17-21. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1257. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the scope and parameters of the ADA continue to be defined with regards to
HIV infection. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 1257.
110. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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the case for further factual findings.111 First, the Court affirmed the low-
er court's holding that HIV infection, both symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic, is a disability under the ADA by finding that HIV infection is a
physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction."12 Second, in addressing application of ADA's direct
threat clause, the Court remanded for further factual findings consistent
with its analysis of the issue: While the significance of the risk posed by
accommodation or treatment must be evaluated from the position of the
person refusing service or treatment, that evaluation must be based upon
medical or other objective evidence. 1' 3 Thus, the Court vacated the
lower court's decision with instructions that briefs on remand be directed
at the direct threat issue.114
A. HIV UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, first looked to the lan-
guage of the Act to determine whether HIV infection constituted a
disability.115 The ADA defines a disability in three ways, but since the
Court found Abbott disabled under one of them, a physical impairment
that substantially limits major life activities, it did not consider the
remaining two definitions. 116 The Court then laid out the three steps
which it would use to evaluate Abbott's claim that HIV was a disability
under the ADA.117 First, it would consider whether Abbot's HIV infec-
tion was a physical impairment."l 8 The second step was to identify the
life activity Abbott claimed her disability substantially limited and then
determine whether it was a "major life activity" within the definition of
the ADA.119 Third, the Court would consider whether there was a causal
link between the first two questions by examining whether Abbott's
111. See id. at 2213.
112. See id. at 2209.
113. See id. at 2210, 2213.
114. See id. at 2213.
115. See id. at 2201. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens joined in this analysis. Id. at
2213. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed separate concurrences, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Thomas and Scalia, and in part by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Id.
116. See generally id. (defining subsection two's definition of disability, with respect to the
individual as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment." See id. at 2201 (citing ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
117. See id. at 2202.
118. See id.
119. See id. The Court only looked to Abbott's claim that her major life activity was reproduc-
tion and child rearing, although it acknowledged that Abbott's brief and the amici briefs noted several
other possible major life activities affected by her HIV-positive status. See id. The Court did so
because of its policy to review only issues raised at the appellate level. See id. However, the Court
did acknowledge that there were foreseeably many other major life activities affecting Abbott or
others in her situation. See id.
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impairment substantially limited her major life activity.1 20 Finally, to
interpret the ADA's definition of a "individual with a disability," the
Court looked to the Rehabilitation Actl21 and the definition for
"handicap" from the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,122 from
which the ADA's definition was derived. 123 The following discussion
tracks the Court's analytical framework, beginning by discussing
whether HIV is a physical impairment.
1. HIV as a Physical Impairment
The Court began by noting that the current definition of physical
impairment, as provided in Department of Health and Human Services
regulations, does not contain a representative list of disorders for fear
that such a list would be read as excluding any non-enumerated dis-
orders. 124 Instead, the present definition, retained from the earliest inter-
pretation of the Rehabilitation Act, considers a mental or physical
impairment to be:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense
organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological
120. See id.
121. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
122. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(i) (1994).
123. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426,
437-38 (1986); Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S.
60, 65 (1945)). The Court noted that when Congress repeats a well-established term from earlier
legislation in new legislation, it is presumed that the intent is for the new legislation to be construed
according to earlier interpretations. See id. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that in the case of
the ADA, Congress adopted the specific statutory provision that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such titles." Id. (citing ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)).
124. See id. However, commentary accompanying the regulation provides a non-exhaustive list
that includes: "diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and alcoholism." id. See also 45 C.F.R.
pt. 84, app. A, at 334 (1997) (citing legislative history supporting the contention that the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare did not include a representative list out of fear that such a list would be
used to limit the legislation).
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disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.125
The Court found Abbott's condition fell under the first prong of the
definition because of HIV's effects on her hemicl26 and lymphatic127
systems.128
Next, the Court acknowledged that HIV infection was not included
in the text of the ADA in part because HIV was not identified as the
cause of AIDS until 1983.129 The Court then described the destructive
path that HIV infection takes through the human body, detailing the
process in which HIV progresses to AIDS and eventually to death.130
The Court noted that while the symptoms that each individual
experiences at each stage of the disease vary to some degree in severity
and type, the disease always damages a victim's white blood cells
immediately.1 31 The Court thus found that the immediacy with which
HIV begins a severe and destructive assault on the human body's white
blood cells makes HIV a physiological disorder and therefore an
impairment, as defined by the ADA, from the moment of infection.132
125. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997)). The Court further
noted that in 1980, after responsibility for implementation and enforcement of Section 504 shifted to
the DOJ and the Attorney General, the definition of "physical or mental impairment" was adopted
from the HEW regulation cited above. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1998); see also Bragdon, 118 S.
Ct. at 2203 (citing verbatim the 1977 interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act's definition).
126. The hemic system is the system of the body having to do with blood. See WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 890.
127. The lymphatic system is the process by which the fluid containing white blood cells is
returned to the blood in response to inflammation or the presence of antigens. See WEBsTER ENCYCLO-
PEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1148.
128. See Bragdon, 118 S. CL at 2204.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2203-05. The Court began by noting that the primary stage of the disease begins
immediately upon exposure, lasts three months and results in a decline in the number of white blood
cells. See id. Mononucleosis-type symptoms emerge approximately one to six weeks after infection,
and HIV antibodies are detectable in the blood stream within three weeks. See id. The next stage of
the disease is often referred to as asymptomatic, but this is misleading since clinical symptoms persist.
See id. This stage usually lasts between seven and eleven years, with a concentration of the virus
appearing in the lymph nodes where it further attacks the CD4+ (white blood cells). See id. These
CD4+ cells decline at a rate of 5% to 10% (40 to 80 cells/mm3) per year during this stage of the
disease. See id. The final stage is when the infection progresses to actual AIDS. See id. At this point,
a person's CD4+ count is below 200 cells/mn3 of blood, or CD4+ cells constitute less than 14% of the
total lymphocytes. See id. At this stage of the disease, conditions such as pneumocystis carninii pneu-
monia, Kaposi's sarcoma and non-Hodgkins lymphoma persist in conjunction with fever, weight loss,
fatigue, lesions, nausea and diarrhea. See id. Death usually occurs when the CD4+ count falls below




1999] CASE COMMENT 625
2. Reproduction and Child Bearing as Major Life Activities
Having found HIV to be an impairment, Justice Kennedy turned to
whether Abbott's claimed disability substantially affected a major life
activity, a required component of ADA claims. 133 While the Court
acknowledged that Abbott made several arguments to show how HIV
infection substantially limits major life activities, the Court addressed
only the disease's impact on reproduction, framing the issue as whether
reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA.134
The Court began by examining the plain meaning of the word
"major." 135 The Court deferred to the First Circuit Court of Appeal's
holding that "[t]he plain meaning of the word 'major' denotes com-
parative importance and suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining
an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance."1 36
The Court then acknowledged that reproduction, which along with its
accompanying sexual dynamics is at the head of the process of life, was
a major life activity. 137
In his brief, Bragdon conceded the importance of reproduction, but
he attempted to distinguish it from the representative major life activities
inherited by the ADA from the Rehabilitation Act.13 8 Bragdon insisted
that Congress listed these activities because they have a public, daily or
economic character.1 39 However, the Court dismissed this argument,
133. See id. at 2204-05.
134. See id. at 2205.
135. See id. The definition of a disability in the text of the ADA is "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." ADA, 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) (1994).
136. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir.
1998)).
137. See id. Although the Court did not specifically state that this was the case, support for its
conclusion might be inferred from case law defining fundamental rights. See, e.g., Cary v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing decisions regarding childbearing as a fundamental
right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing the freedom of the individual to be free
of unwarranted government intrusion into the fundamental right to decide whether to bear a child);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating insufficiently narrowly tailored state legis-
lation because of the fundamental nature of the right to procreation and matrimony); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding that procreation is fundamental to the existence and survival of the
race).
138. Brief for Petitioner Bragdon at 14, 28, 30, 31, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)
(No. 97-156) see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1998) (standing for the proposition that the represen-
tative and nonexclusive major life activities recognized by the ADA include caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1998).
139. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (citing Brief for Petitioner Bragdon at 14, 28, 30, 31, Brag-
don (No. 97-156)); see also Brief for Petitioner Bragdon at 36-37, Bragdon (No. 97-156) (citing
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996)). In Krauel, the plaintiff claimed
a violation of the ADA because her employer denied insurance coverage for fertility treatments. 95
F.3d at 676. The court held that infertility was not an impairment that substantially affected a major
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pointing out that nothing in the definition of the word "major" signifies
that an activity not having a public, economic or daily dimension is
regarded as so much less important than other activities that it is not
included within the meaning of "major."1 40 The Court again referred
to the Rehabilitation Act, noting that it did not provide a general prin-
ciple for defining a major life activity but instead provided a represen-
tative list of possible examples. 141 The list includes functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning and working.142 The Court noted that
caring for one's self and performing manual tasks, as provided in the
representative list of the Rehabilitation Act, disposed of Bragdon's
argument that a major life activity must have a public or economic
character. 143
Further, the Court found that the definitions in the Rehabilitation
Act's regulations support the proposition that reproduction is a major
life activity because it is at least as important as working and learning. 144
The Court went on to find that Bragdon had posed no credible basis for
contending that a major life activity must have a public, economic or
daily character. 145 Therefore the Court affirmed the First Circuit's
holding that reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA.146
3. HIV Infection's Substantial Effect on Reproduction
In the final part of its analysis, the Court found Abbott's ability to
reproduce was substantially affected in two ways.147 First, an HIV-
positive woman poses a significant risk of infecting her male partner in
life activity under the ADA. See id. at 677. It appears that Bragdon construed the court's statement
that since Krauel's infertility did not interfere with her employment to mean that the ADA covered
only impairments with a public, daily or economic character. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205; see also
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677.
140. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct at 2205.
141. See id.
142. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)).
143. See id. It appears that the Court specifically rejected the argument that a major life activity
had to have a public or economic character. See id. Instead, it appears the Court adopted a definition
that related to the comparative importance, relative to the activities provided in the Rehabilitation Act,
of the activity to the individual, without regard for the activities' public or economic character. See id.
144. See id. The Rehabilitation Act's representative list defined major life activities to include
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1998).
145. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. Bragdon sought to equate the definition of a "major activi-
ty" to that of a "public activity." See id. The Court dismissed the attempt to limit this definition be-
cause the representative list of the Rehabilitation Act includes activities which are not necessarily
public, such as caring for one's self and performing manual tasks. See id.
146. See id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
147. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. The ADA defines a major life activity to be substantially
limited when it is restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which it can be performed in
comparison to most people. See id.
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the process of conception.148 To support this assertion, the Court cited
several medical studies that consider the risk of infection to be around
twenty to twenty-five percent, a statistically significant percentage.149
Second, an infected woman poses a risk of infecting her child
through perinatal transmission.150 In support of this contention, the
Court examined knowledge of infection rates, drawn from medical infor-
mation available in 1994, that established an approximately twenty-five
percent risk of infection.151 Bragdon acknowledged this risk, but he
maintained that antiretroviral therapy15 2 could reduce the risk to levels as
low as eight percent.153 The Court rejected this argument, however,
noting that the relevant regulatory language required that the substan-
tiality of risk be assessed without reference to the mitigating procedures
available. 154 Regardless of this, however, the Court found that even an
eight percent risk of infection qualified as a substantial limitation on
reproduction. 155
The Court also addressed the danger to public health caused by
transmission of HIV through conception or child birth.156 The Court
148. See id.
149. See id. (citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmission of HIV, in AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE
1.9-.8, and tbl. 2 (1984); see also Haverkos & Battjes, Female-to-Male Transmission of HIV, 268
JAMA 1855, 1856 tbl. (1992)).
150. See id. Perinatal transmission is defined as a period extending approximately from the 28th
week of gestation to the 28th day after birth. See MosaY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH
DICTIONARY 1193 (4th ed. 1994).
151. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing Report of a Consensus Work Shop, Maternal Factors
Involved in Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV-1, 5 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES
1019, 1020 (1992) (placing the risk of mother-to-child transmission between 14% and 40%, with most
studies falling around the 25% to 30% range); Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmis-
sion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1173, 1176 (1994) (finding that the risk is approximately 25.5%); see also STRAPENS & FEINBERG, MEDI-
CAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 32 (showing that the average risk of infection is approximately 25%)).
152. Antiretroviral drug treatment is a term used to describe a multi-drug treatment program em-
ployed to combat retro viruses such as HIV. See Mary Mycek et al., Lippincott's Illustrated Reviews,
in PHARMACOLOGY 368 (2d ed. 1997).
153. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206; see also Connor, et al., supra note 152, at 1176 (showing a
transmission risk of 8.3%); Sperling et al., Maternal Viral Load, Zidovudine Treatment, and the Risk of
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I from Mother to Infant, 335 NEW ENG. J. M ED.
1621, 1622 (1996) (showing a transmission risk of 7.6%).
154. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. The requirement that the risks be assessed without
reference to the mitigating procedures available are found in the applicable statutory provisions. See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.10, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (No.
97-156) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B at 611 (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 351 (1997)).
155. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. The Court noted that the Solicitor General discounted the
relevance of the 8% figure because regulatory language requires that the substantial limitation im-
posed by a disability be evaluated without consideration of mitigating measures. See id. (citing Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.10, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (No. 97-156)
(citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B at 611 (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 351 (1997)). The Court further
stated that "[iut cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal
disease to one's child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction." Bragdon, 118 S. Ct.
at 2206.
156. See id.
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reasoned that this risk qualified HIV infection as a "substantial limita-
tion" on reproduction. 157 Finally, the Court stated that the definition of
substantial limitation did not require that the difficulties experienced by
the infected person be insurmountable.1 58 The decision of an individual
suffering from a disability to engage in a particular behavior is no
longer a personal choice when such an individual faces substantial limi-
tations because of his or her condition. 159 After this analysis, the Court
found no triable issue of fact and so affirmed the summary judgment
holdings of the District Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals:
Abbott's HIV infection was a physical impairment that substantially
limited her major life activity of reproduction and brought her within the
coverage of the ADA.160
B. ADDITIONAL AGENCY, JUDICIAL AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT
FOR THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT HIV INFECTION SUBSTANTIALLY
LIMITS REPRODUCTION
The Court cited additional support for its holding that asymptomat-
ic HIV infection does significantly impair the major life activity of
reproduction.161 It derived this support from the findings of govern-
ment agencies and judicial opinions under the Rehabilitation Act.162
The Court was willing to consider these older decisions and findings
because when previously defined statutory terms are incorporated into
new legislation, the new legislation is to be construed in a manner
consistent with prior judicial and administrative statements. 163
First, the Court looked to the Rehabilitation Act for further support
of its inclusion of HIV infection within the protections of the ADA.164
Specifically, the Court found that every agency interpreting the Rehabil-
157. See id. The Court also noted that in some states, such as Iowa, Maryland, Montana, Utah,
North Dakota and Washington, it is illegal for an HIV-infected person to have sex with others. See id.
While there are no reported North Dakota cases in which an HIV-infected individual has been
charged under this statute, other states have charged and convicted persons under similar statutes. See
Burk v. State, 478 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ga. App. 1996) (convicting defendant of a felony under the
Georgia statute). The impact Bragdon will have on such statutes in not clear. Georgia, South Carolina
and Tennessee also have statutes making transmission of HIV a felony. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60
(1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN CODE. ANN. § 39-13-109 (Supp.
1996).
158. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 2207.
161. See id.
162. See generally id. at 2207-09 (explaining that the Court's decision is supported by administra-
tive and judicial precedent).
163. See id. at 2208. "[When] Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,
Congress normally can be presumed to have knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated
law." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
164. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
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itation Act found persons with asymptomatic HIV to be covered.165 For
instance, the DOJ issued an opinion in 1988 concluding that the Rehabil-
itation Act protected symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected indi-
viduals from discrimination.166 This opinion further found that HIV
infection imposed a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
reproduction.167 The Court therefore noted that "[w]ithout exception,
the other agencies to address the problem reached the same result."168
The Court also examined judicial opinions prior to the enactment of the
ADA, noting that every court which addressed the issue concluded that
asymptomatic HIV infection met the definition of a handicap under the
Rehabilitation Act. 169
The Court derived additional support for its decision from adminis-
trative guidelines issued by the DOJ.170 The DOJ drafted these guide-
lines for the implementation of the public accommodation provisions of
Title III of the ADA.171 The Court noted that the DOJ's definition of a
disability was consistent with the Court's definition, because the regula-
tions clearly stated that Congress intended for the ADA's definition to
be construed with the same construction as the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of handicap.172
The DOJ, however, went even further, adding symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV infection to the representative list of disorders which
165. See id. at 2207-08 (citing Federal Contract Compliance Manual App. 6D, 8 FEP Manual
405:352 (Dec. 23, 1988); In re David Ritter, No. 03890089, 1989 WL 609697 at *10 (EEOC, Dec. 8,
1989); see also Comptroller General's Task Force on AIDS in the Workplace, Coping with AIDS in
the GAO Workplace: Task Force Report 29 (Dec. 1987); Report of the Presidential Commission on
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 113-14, 122-23 (June 1988)). These agencies have
also adhered to this conclusion since the enactment of the ADA. See id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103
(1997); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103 (1998); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103 (1997); 24 C.F.R. § 9.103 (1997); 34 C.F.R. §
1200.103 (1997); 45 C.F.R. §§ 2301.103, 2490.103 (1997); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr.,
[1991-94 Transfer Binder] CCH Employment Practices Guide para. 5340, pp. 6110-12 (Apr. 20,
1992), aff'd, id. para. 5362, pp. 6249-50 at *1 (Dept. Of Health & Human Servs. Departmental
Appeals Bd., Sept. 25, 1992); In re Rosebud Sioux Tribe, No. 93-504-1. 1994 WL 603015 (Dept. Of
Health & Human Servs. Department of Appeals Bd., July 14, 1994); In re David T. Martin, No.
01954089, 1997 WL 151524 at *4 (EEOC, Mar. 27, 1997)).
166. See id. (citing Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-infected Individu-
als, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 264-265, 271 (Sept. 27, 1988)
(preliminary print) (footnote omitted)).
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See id.; see also supra note 69.
170. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208-09.
171. See id. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals by
private entities that provide public accommodations. See ADA 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12189 (1994).
Title III specifically designates the DOJ as the agency responsible for issuing "regulations, to render
technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, and to
enforce Title III in court." See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2209 (citation omitted).
172. See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.103(a) (1998) (indicating that Congress intended for the
ADA's definition of handicapped to be given the same construction as the Rehabilitation Act's
definition).
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constitute a physical impairment. 173 In addition, the Court found further
support for its holding from agencies authorized to implement the other
sections of the ADA, all of which had concluded that HIV infection is a
physical impairment under the ADA.174 The Court therefore concluded
that holding HIV infection to be an impairment which substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction was supported by all of the
regulatory authorities which had addressed the issue. 175
C. THE DIRECT THREAT ISSUE
The Court next addressed whether a private health care provider
performing an invasive procedure on an infectious patient in a tradition-
al office setting posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others
within the context of regular office treatment.176 Additionally, the Court
considered whether courts should defer to the health care provider's
professional judgment when that judgment is reasonable in light of
current medical knowledge. 177 Finally, the Court considered the lower
courts' finding in favor of Abbott's summary judgment motion, ques-
tioning whether Bragdon could have raised a triable issue of fact regard-
ing the direct threat issue. 178 In the final analysis, the Court remanded
the case for further exploration consistent with its opinion.179
The Court first considered the language of the ADA and noted that
Bragdon could have legally refused to treat Abbott if her HIV condition
173. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1997)). The DOJ apparently did this to clarify that
HIV infection was considered in the implementation of Title III accommodation provisions. See id.
Since the Department of Health and Welfare originated the definition of handicap later adopted by the
Rehabilitation Act prior to the identification of HIV or AIDS, it was logical for the DOJ to recognize
HIV specifically when it revisited the implementation of Title III of the ADA. Cf. id.
174. See id. at 2209 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(l)(iii) (1997)); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 350
(1997); 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.3, 38.3 (1997); 56 Fed. Reg. 13,858 (1991); U.S. DEIT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILInES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 4 (Nov.
1993); EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICAN WITH DISABILmES ACT 11-3 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANU-
AL]; EEOC INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL § 902.2 (d), at 902-13 to 902-14 (reissued Mar. 14, 1995) [herein-
after EEOC INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL] reprinted in 2 BNA EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 902:0013
(1998); EEOC INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL § 902.4(c) (1), at 902-21; § 902.2 (d), at 902-14 n.18; EEOC
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 11-4)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 2209-10. The case presented two additional questions for review, but the Court,
without explanation, refused to grant certiorari. See id. The first question denied review was "[w]hat
is the proper standard of judicial review under Title III of the ADA of a private health care provider's
judgment that the performance of certain invasive procedures in his office would pose a direct threat
to the health or safety of others?" Id. The other question was "[d]id petitioner, Randon Bragdon,
D.M.D., raise a genuine issue of fact for trial as to whether he was warranted in his judgment that the
performance of certain invasive procedures on a patient in his office would have posed a direct threat
to the health or safety of others?" Id.




"pose[d] a direct threat to the health or safety of others."180 The Court
noted that the direct threat provision of the ADA was derived from its
decision in Arline, which interpreted the Rehabilitation Act and defined a
direct threat to be "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or proce-
dures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." 181 This inter-
pretation by the Arline Court meant that under the Rehabilitation Act,
and later the ADA, an employer could refuse to hire an individual who
posed a significant risk of transmitting an infectious disease to other
persons. 182
In the services provider context, the Court continued, a provider
may refuse service to an individual with an infectious disease only where
there is a significant risk of transmission to others. 183 The Court also
noted that while the significance of such a risk must be determined from
the point of view of the individual who refuses the accommodation, the
risk must be evaluated using medical or other objective evidence.1 84
Therefore, a court evaluating Bragdon's actions was required to assess
the risk Abbott posed based on objective, scientific information available
in 1994.185 The Court also stated that Bragdon received no special defer-
ence because he was a licensed dentist. 186 Finally, the Court found that
the reasonableness of Bragdon's actions should be evaluated from the
viewpoint of public health authorities and could only be refuted by
generally-accepted medical opinions with support from credible scien-
tific evidence.187 With these criteria in mind, the Court turned to a review
of the lower courts' findings on the direct threat issue.I 88
The Court initially acknowledged that the First Circuit properly
reviewed the district court's findings for clear error, but it expressed
concern that the circuit court may have mistakenly relied upon the 1993
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Dentistry Guidelines 189 and the 1991
180. Id. at 2210 (citing ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994)).
181. See id. (acknowledging that the ADA's direct threat language was derived from School Bd.
of Nassau County. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
182. See id. In 1990, Congress chose to codify in the ADA the direct threat language developed
in Arline and adopted by the Rehabilitation Act. See id.; see also ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)
(1994).




187. See id. at 2210-11 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B, at 626 (1997) (standing for the proposition
that a healthcare professional may refute the prevailing medical consensus by proffering other
credible scientific authority); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987); W.
KEETON, aT AL., PROSSR A'D KETON ON LAw OFTORTs § 32, at 187 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing how
prevailing medical opinions may be refuted)).
188. Id.
189. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210-11. The Center for Disease Control [hereinafter CDC]
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American Dental Association Policy on HIV190 in evaluating whether
Bragdon raised a triable issue of fact on the direct threat issue. 191 In
generally approving the First Circuit's standard of review, the Court
pointed out that the court had correctly rejected the district court's reli-
ance on affidavits from a CDC official that addressed risk of HIV trans-
mission in the dental field because it was not clear that the conclusion
developed in the affidavits had been published by the CDC at the time
Bragdon refused to treat Abbott.192
The Court, however, did express concern that the CDC guidelines
merely outlined the CDC's recommendations to address the risk of
transmitting HIV without actually assessing the level of risk. 193 The
Court was also concerned that the First Circuit assigned too much weight
to the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV. 194 The policy
stated that there was very little risk of HIV transmission through office
dental treatment when recommended procedures were followed.195 The
Court indicated that these two sources may have allowed Bragdon to
raise a triable issue of fact at trial, making the circuit's summary
judgment ruling a remandable error. 196
provided recommendations concerning every aspect of dental practice, including vaccinations for
dental workers, protective attire and barrier techniques, hand care, use of sharp instruments and
needles, sterilization of instruments, disinfection of the dental unit and environmental surfaces, use and
care of hand pieces and other dental devices, and single-use disposable instruments. Abbott v.
Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 588 n.7 (D. Me. 1995) (citing CDC, RECOMMENDED INFECTION-CONTROL
PRACTIcES FOR DENTISTRY).
190. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210-11. The American Dental Association's 1991 Policy on
AIDS, HIV Infection and the Practice of Dentistry stated that "[c]urrent scientific and
epidemiological evidence indicates that there is little risk of transmission of infectious diseases through
dental treatment if recommended infection control procedures are routinely followed." Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 945-46 (lst Cir. 1997) (citing the American Dental Association's 1991 Policy
on AIDS, HIV Infection and the Practice of Dentistry). Further, the court noted that "patients with
HIV infection may be safely treated in private dental offices when appropriate infection control
procedures are employed." Id.
191. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210-1l.
192. See id. at 2211. Wayne Marianos, D.D.S., M.P.H. was a Captain in the United States Public
Health Service at the CDC and served as the Director of the Division of Oral Health. Abbott, 912 F.
Supp. at 589. "Dr. Marianos' affidavits stated that when implemented, the CDC recommendations re-
duce the already low risk of disease transmission in the dental environment, from either patient to
dental health care worker, dental health care worker to patient, or patient to patient." Id. Furthe-
rmore, "Routine dental treatment to persons with HIV or AIDS requires no additional procedures
beyond the CDC recommendations." Id.
193. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2211.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. The Court noted that the CDC "[g]uidelines do not necessarily contain implicit
assumptions conclusive of the point to be decided." Id. The Court also expressed concern over the
American Dental Association policy, because the Association is a professional organization and not a
public health authority. See id. It was also unclear how much of the Association's policy, which
assessed the risk of transmission, was based on ethical and professional considerations rather than
actual scientific data. See id. at 2211-12. However, the Court did acknowledge that the policy
provided some evidence of objective assessment as to the risk posed by HIV infected individuals
treated in a dental setting when infection control procedures are followed. See id.
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The Court also pointed out that the circuit was correct in refusing to
give deference to Bragdon's offer to treat Abbott in a hospital setting.197
Bragdon made no factual showing to support his belief that the hospital
setting would reduce the risk of infection or that he in fact had privileges
at a local area hospital, and Bragdon's own expert witness testified to the
lack of any scientific basis to support the theory that treatment in a
hospital would reduce the risk of infection. 198 Therefore, the Court
found that the First Circuit made the correct ruling on this issue. 199
The Court then noted that Bragdon only had to establish a triable
issue of fact to overcome a summary judgment motion on the direct
threat issue.200 While the Court pointed out that the record did provide
information, outside of the CDC and American Dental Association re-
ports, that indicated it is safe to treat HIV-infected individuals in dental
offices, it was unclear whether the expert testimony on Abbott's behalf
was based on medical facts known in 1994.201 Further, the Court ac-
knowledged that even discounting Abbott's expert testimony, it was
questionable whether Bragdon could have raised a triable issue of fact
based upon his reliance on two points.202
The first point was Bragdon's reliance on an inconclusive medical
report which claimed that use of high-speed drills in the presence of
surface cooling water created the risk of water-vapor-airborne HIV
transmission. 203 The Court noted that even Bragdon's expert, who pre-
sented the medical report to the lower court, conceded on cross
examination that the risk of HIV being transmitted by vapor spray was
nonexistent.204 Therefore, the Court concluded that this expert's testi-
mony was based on mere opinion without positive data and did not have
a "traceable, analytical basis in objective fact." 205
The second point that led the Court, despite its eventual holding, to
believe that Bragdon might still be unable to defeat a motion for summa-
ry judgment was Bragdon's citation to a 1994 CDC report. 206 This
report proffered that as of September 1994, seven dental health care
workers had possibly been infected through occupational transmis-
197. See id.
198. See id. at 2211.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. Bragdon's refusal to treat Abbott was evaluated within the context of medical knowl-
edge available at the time he refused to treat her, September of 1994. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1998).
202. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2212
203. See id. (citing Johnson & Robinson, Human Immunodeficiency Virus-I (HIV-1) in the Vapors
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sion. 20 7 The Court pointed out that in 1994 the CDC did not know
whether the health care workers became infected because of occupa-
tional exposure. 208 Further, the Court noted that while the report might
have provided some support for Bragdon's position, the Court did not
believe such evidence alone would justify a reversal of the summary
judgment finding. 20 9
Nevertheless, the Court remanded the case to the lower court. 210
The Court reached this decision because the record was unclear as to
what was known, and when was it known, with relation to the CDC report
and how much deference was given to the American Dental Association
policy. 211 Remand would allow the lower court to make additional
factual findings and to apply an analysis consistent with the Court's
holding, therefore leaving open the possibility that Bragdon could
present a triable issue of fact on the sufficiency of risk question.212
D. THE OTHER OPINIONS
A majority of the Court, consisting of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens, joined the opinion of Justice Kennedy.213 Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg filed separate concurrences. 2 14 Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed an opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined
and in which Justice O'Connor joined in part, which did not find
asymptomatic HIV infection to be a disability affecting a major life
activity under the ADA but which concurred on the remand of the direct
threat issue.215
207. See id (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN S ERVICES, PUBUC H EALTH SERVICE, CDC,
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, VOL. 6, No. 1, at 15 tbl. 11 (June 1994)).
208. See id. The workers' source of infection was unknown because they did not submit to
testing at an appropriate time after their exposure, but it was unclear whether this reason was known
to the CDC in 1994. See id.
209. See id. The Court's analysis was limited because it had refused to grant certiorari on wheth-
er Bragdon had presented a genuine issue of fact for trial and because the briefs it received were not
directed at the issue of sufficiency of the risk. See id. at 2213.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id at 2213. In remanding the case, the Court noted that while the First Circuit might
reach the same conclusion as it had initially, the remand would permit full exploration of the issue.
See id.
213. See id. at 2213.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 2213.
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1. Justice Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg Concur
In an apparent compromise vote to assure a majority, Justice Stevens
joined the opinion of Justice Kennedy. 216 Justice Stevens indicated that
he believed that Abbott's condition was clearly a disability under the
ADA and that Bragdon had not raised a triable issue of fact on the direct
threat issue.217 Therefore, Justice Stevens would rather have affirmed
absolutely the lower court's opinions. 218 However, because he agreed
with the legal reasoning of the majority on the direct threat issue, and
because the lower courts may have relied upon data that was inconclu-
sive, he opted to concur.219
Writing separately, Justice Ginsburg also concurred in the majori-
ty's holding.2 20 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence stated her belief that
the statutory definitions were correctly met and that "[n]o rational legis-
lator, it seems to me apparent, would require nondiscrimination once
symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the disease,
though present, is not yet visible." 221 However, Justice Ginsburg indicat-
ed that she felt comfortable remanding the case on the direct threat issue,
opting to err on the side of caution so as to protect health care
workers. 222
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist, With Whom Justices Scalia and
Thomas Join, and With Whom Justice O'Connor Joins as
to Part Two, Concurring in the Judgment in Part, but
Dissenting in Part
Chief Justice Rehnquist's strongly-worded opinion starts by looking
at the exact language of the ADA and points out that an individualized
inquiry is required when determining whether an individual has a dis-
216. See id. Justice Stevens noted that while he did not "believe petitioner has sustained his bur-
den of adducing evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the significance of the risk posed
by treating respondent in his office" he was "in agreement with the legal analysis in Justice [Ken-
nedy's] opinion." See id. Therefore, he noted that he joined the Kennedy opinion "in order to provide





221. Id. at 2213-14.
222. See id. at 2214. Justice Ginsburg stated that "in view of the 'importance [of the issue] to
health care workers,' . . . it is wise to remand." See id. (citation omitted). She also noted that "[b]y
taking this course, the Court ensures a fully informed determination whether respondent Abbott's
disease posed a significant risk to the health or safety of [petitioner Bragdon] that [could not] be
eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures." See id. (citation omitted).
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ability. 223 The Chief Justice conceded that Abbott's HIV-positive status
was a physical impairment, noting that Bragdon did not dispute that
fact. 224 However, while the majority of the Court considered the next
relevant question to be whether reproduction was a major life activity, the
Chief Justice indicated that he thought the issue should have been
individually directed to Abbott's own desire to conceive a child.225
Chief Justice Rehnquist therefore believed that the question should
have been whether reproduction, prior to becoming HIV positive, was a
major life activity of Abbott's.226 He pointed out that the record provid-
ed no evidence that this was the case and further noted that Abbott
testified in her deposition that her HIV status had not in any way limited
her ability to carry out life functions. 227 The dissent therefore argued
that reproduction was not a major life activity of Abbott's.228
Next, the dissent turned to the more generalized question of whether
reproduction could ever be a major life activity, as insisted by the
majority. 229 While the majority defined "major" as being of compara-
tive importance to the representative list of activities, the Chief Justice
sought an alternative definition. 230 He sought to define "major" as
being "greater in quantity, number, or extent." 231 He considered this
definition to be more indicative of the illustrative list of activities
included in the statute, the link between the activities being that they are
frequently within the day-to-day activities of a normally functioning
person.232
The dissent further indicated that the majority was wrong in assert-
ing as a general matter that reproduction is a major life activity simply
because the ADA defines "physical impairment" to include physiologi-
223. See id. (noting that "'major life activities' allegedly limited by an impairment must be those
'of such individual,"' and because the District Court issued summary judgment on the questions before
the court, all disputed issues of material fact must be resolved against Abbott).
224. See id.
225. See id. It appears that by "individualized" the Chief Justice meant that the disability and its
negative effect on a major life activity should be examined solely from the vantage point of the
individual making the claim. See id.
226. See id. at 2214-15. However, the majority assumed that reproduction could be a major life
activity without an individualized assessment, a point the dissent was clearly not ready to concede.
See id.
227. See id. at 2215.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. (showing the representative list of major life activities listed within in the statute as
"caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1997); 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)).
231. See id. (citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 702 (10th ed. 1994) as providing alter-
native definitions to the word "major"). It appears that the dissent, by choosing this definition, be-
lieved it was the frequency in which a person engaged in an action that determined whether or not it is




cal disorders affecting the reproductive system. 233 The dissent pointed
out that many reproductive disorders affect the major life activities
defined in the language of the ADA and are not mentioned specifically
elsewhere in the statute. 234 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the
majority had erroneously decided that reproduction was a major life
activity. 235
The dissenters next expressed their opinion that even if reproduc-
tion is considered a major life activity, asymptomatic HIV infection does
not substantially limit that activity. 236 The dissent first disputed the
majority's cohtention that an HIV-infected woman could not engage in
sexual intercourse, give birth or raise a child to maturity. 237 The dissent
pointed out that the ADA's definition focuses on the present tense
definition of "limits" and claimed that Abbott was not limited in any
way from bearing or raising a child.238 The dissent argued that, using
the majority's logic, any individual with a genetic marker for a potential
future debilitating disease would be considered presently disabled. 239
On the direct threat issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the
majority that the lower court's summary judgment should be vacated,
but he did so for different reasons. 240 The dissenters' primary point of
contention was the deference and weight the majority gave to the views
of public health authorities. 24 1 The Chief Justice reasoned that he was
aware of no legal practice whereby courts were required to give the
scientific views of politically-appointed public health authorities special
weight in litigation between private parties in federal court.242
The Chief Justice was also unpersuaded by the majority's reliance
on a statement taken from Arline indicating that the risk of contagion
should be evaluated by the courts in deference to the "reasonable
233. See id. The majority had argued that because the Rehabilitation Act referenced reproduc-
tive disorders in an illustrative list, it was the intent of the drafters to include such disorders. See id.
Therefore, when the ADA was created, it also received the import of the reproductive disorders. See
id.
234. See id. (showing that dysmenorrhea, endometriosis and cancer limit a woman's ability to en-
gage in major life activities and that these are not specifically referenced in the language of the
ADA).
235. See id.
236. See id. at 2215-16.
237. See id. at 2216.
238. See id. The dissent supported this position by stating that "[w]hile individuals infected with
HIV may choose not to engage in these activities, there is no support in language, logic, or our case




241. See id. The majority questioned the First Circuit's reliance on the 1993 CDC Dentistry
Guidelines and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV. See id. at 2211.
242. See id. at 2217.
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medical judgments of public health officials." 243 He considered this
phrase to be dictum and pointed out that Arline had an attached footnote
which seemed to indicate that the Court was stressing respect for general
medical judgment, not preferring the judgment of public health authori-
ties over their private sector counterparts. 244  The dissent therefore
reasoned that if medical judgment from both the public and private
sector was evaluated on its merit, Bragdon did present enough evidence
to avoid summary judgment on the direct threat issue, making remand
appropriate. 245
3. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in the Judgment in Part,
but Dissenting in Part
Justice O'Connor was in agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent to the extent it argued that Abbott's condition should be evalu-
ated on an individualized basis and that Abbott had not proven a limita-
tion upon a major life activity.2 46 However, Justice O'Connor did not
address the issue of whether other intimate or family relationships consti-
tuted major life activities or whether an individual's HIV-positive status
could constitute a limitation on reproduction if reproduction were a
major life activity. 247 Therefore, Justice O'Connor did not join the part
of the Chief Justice's opinion addressing the limitation that HIV
infection places on a major life activity. 248
In conclusion, the Bragdon decision effectively held that asympto-
matic HIV infection is a disability under the ADA that substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction.249 However, on the issue of
whether HIV infection posed a direct threat to the health of safety of
others within the context of routine dental care, the Court remanded the
case to the lower court for further factual findings. 250
243. Id. (citing School Bd. of Nassau County. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)).
244. See id. The footnote read: "This case does not present, and we do not address, the question
whether courts should also defer to the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which
an employer has relied." Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.18.
245. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2217. In light of the view that both public and private sector
scientific evidence should be evaluated equally on their merits, the dissent considered the 1994 CDC
report identifying seven possible instances of HIV transmission to dental healthcare workers as pro-
viding support to overcome summary judgment. See id. Additionally, the dissent considered Brag-
don's offer of a report documenting 42 instances of occupational transmission of HIV in healthcare
workers to be persuasive. See id. The dissent also noted that the possibility of exposure need only be
that of a risk and not certain infection. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 2217-18.
248. See id.





Bragdon firmly established that asymptomatic HIV infection is a
disability under the ADA because it substantially limits the major life
activity of reproduction. 251 The Court, however, left open the possibility
of whether dental treatment of the kind Abbott sought poses a direct
threat to the health of others. 252 On remand, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered supplemental briefing and heard new oral arguments
specifically directed at the question of "whether performance of the
cavity-filling procedure posed a 'direct threat' to others and thereby
came within an exception to the ADA's broad prohibition against dis-
crimination;" it subsequently issued an opinion affirming its original of
summary judgment for Abbott.253
A. THE DIRECT THREAT ISSUE ON REMAND TO THE FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
On remand, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed its prior
grant of summary judgment, reexamining its reliance on the 1993 CDC
Dentistry Guidelines ("the Guidelines") and the American Dental As-
sociation's ("the Association") Policy on AIDS, HIV Infection and the
Practice of Dentistry ("the Policy"). 254 First, the court reviewed the
Guidelines and the Policy, evidence Abbott proffered. 255 The court
noted that the Guidelines were updated from earlier editions in which
text explained that universal precautions would prevent infectious dis-
eases caused by bloodborne pathogens. 256 Next, the court reviewed the
weight given the Policy by addressing the concern that the Policy might
be based on ethical obligations rather than scientific information. 257 The
court found that the Policy was based on scientific fact and noted that
the Association's Council on Scientific Affairs drafted it while a separate
Council on Ethics drafted the ethical policies.258 Therefore, the court
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 88 (Ist Cir. 1998).
254. See id. The court further noted that in order to reverse its prior finding of summary judg-
ment for Abbott, it would have to find either that "(i) Ms. Abbott did not merit judgment as a matter of
law even in the absence of disputed facts, or (ii) that Dr. Bragdon had submitted sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to his direct threat defense." Id.
255. See id. at 88-89.
256. See id. at 89. Specifically, the court noted that the 1986 version of the Guidelines mentioned
the detailed universal precautions would prevent transmission of AIDS. See id. Also, the court noted
that the 1987 version of the Guidelines explained that no additional precautions were required. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. The court noted that the American Dental Association's Council on Scientific
1999] 639
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
concluded that it had properly relied on the documents in question and
that Abbott had formulated a strong motion for summary judgment.259
Second, the court reviewed evidence presented by Bragdon specifi-
cally focusing on evidence of "seven cases that the CDC considered
'possible' HIV patient-to-dental workers transmission." 260 The court
noted that the inquiry was directed to the definition of "possible" as
defined by the CDC in 1994.261 The court concluded that the term "pos-
sible occupational transmission" was well defined in 1994 to mean a
worker who had tested positive after being exposed to the virus at
work.262 This definition was further dependent on the exposed worker
being unable to demonstrate another opportunity for infection and his
or her failure to present him or herself for immediate testing.263 There-
fore, the court concluded that the existence of seven possible cases did
not raise genuine issue of material fact on the direct threat question.264
The court therefore affirmed its prior finding of summary judg-
ment in favor of Abbott, concluding that Bragdon had not raised a
genuine issue of material fact with the district court and that Abbott
merited judgment as a matter of law. 265 However, the court noted that its
holding was limited to the facts presented and cautioned that changing
medical technology might require future courts to hear disputes between
litigants to resolve similar issues differently. 266
Affairs was comprised of 17 dentists and a staff of more than 20 professional experts and consultants.
See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 89-90. The court also noted that it had previously "canvassed eight items of
evidence adduced by Bragdon in an effort to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 89.
261. See id. at 90.
262. See id.
263. See id. The court clarified that "if a dentist knew of seven 'possible' occupational trans-
missions to dental health care workers without understanding that 'possible' meant no more than that
the CDC could not determine whether workers were infected occupationally, he might reasonably
regard the risk of treating an HIV-infected patient to be significant." Id. The court supported this
conclusion by noting that the definition had been defined in two academic articles prior to Bragdon's
refusal to treat Abbott. See id. (citing John A. Molinari, HIV, Health Care Workers and Patients: How
to Ensure Safety in the Dental Office, 124 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 51, 51-52 (1993); Louise J. Short &
David M. Bell, Risk of Occupational Infection with Bloodborne Pathogens in Operating and Delivery
Room Settings, 21 AM. J. INFECrON CONTROL 343, 345 (1993)).
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. The court stated, "The state of scientific knowledge concerning this disease is evolv-
ing, and we caution future courts to consider carefully whether future litigants have been able,
through scientific advances, more complete research, or special circumstances, to present facts and
arguments warranting a different decision." Id.
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B. REPRODUCTION AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY IN LIGHT OF
PROGRESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
A disability does not trigger the ADA unless it substantially limits a
recognized major life activity. 267 While the Bragdon Court acknowl-
edged that there were other possible major life activities that could be
affected by HIV infection, it focused only on reproduction, finding that
Abbott's ability to reproduce was substantially limited in two ways. 268
First, the Court noted the possibility that Abbott might infect her partner
during intercourse. 269  Second, the Court noted the likelihood that
Abbott might infect her child during gestation or childbirth.270 A ques-
tion which remains unanswered by the Bragdon Court is whether an
individual's HIV status will continue to be a substantial limit on repro-
duction in light of advancing medical technology.
This inquiry stands out because while the Bragdon Court examined
the statistical risks associated with each way reproduction is limited by
HIV infection, it did so from the standpoint of 1994 medical technol-
ogy. 27 1 Successful medical advancements have been made in recent
years, however, which can reduce the HIV transmission rate from
mothers to children and can improve the standard of living for individu-
als infected with HIV.272 For example, the Court in Bragdon held that
an eight percent chance of transmitting the HIV virus to one's child
constituted a substantial limitation on reproduction. 273 Assuming this
risk could be reduced, the question remains at what point the indi-
vidual's infection would no longer substantially limit the major life
activity of reproduction. 274
Researchers have suggested that some factors, when used in combi-
nation with drug therapy treatment, 275 may reduce the transmission rate





272. See generally Lynne M. Mofenson, Perinatal Transmission of HIV in Women Receiving Zido-
vudine, 280 JAMA 569 (1998) (showing a reduction in prenatal transmission rates from mother-to-
child). See also David Brown, AIDS Death Rate in '97 Down 47%; New Drug Treatments Credited;
Overall U.S. Mortality Fell 3%, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1998, at AI (showing that people with AIDS/HIV
are living longer because of new antiretroviral drug treatments); CNN Interactive, Affordable Drug
Reduces Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission, Study Says (July 14, 1999) (last visited Sept. 12, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com>.
273. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
274. Cf. Mofenson, supra note 272, at 569 (standing for the proposition that new treatment
methods could reduce the 8% risk of mother-to-child transmission rate recognized by the Court in
Bragdon as too great).
275. One such drug is Zidovudine (3'-Azido-3-Deoxy-Thyinidine, AZT), an antiretroviral drug
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from mothers to their children. 276 Furthermore, there is some support
for the hypothesis that drug treatment in combination with a cesarean
delivery may also lead to a reduced risk of transmission. 277 One scholar
concludes that perinatal HIV transmission rates have fallen with the use
of drugs in combination with changes in related factors and posits that
"[f]urther reduction in transmission for women taking [drug treatment]
may be possible by reducing the incidence of other potentially
modifiable risk factors." 278
Such statistical evidence would have been inadmissible in Bragdon,
because the Court had to consider Bragdon's refusal to treat Abbott
based on medical information available from public health authorities in
1994.279 However, the Court has reexamined prior holdings in other
areas of the law within the context of practical considerations that have
changed over time.280
This type of reevaluation could be applicable to the Bragdon
opinion because of the advances made in HIV and AIDS research since
1994.281 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Bragdon, that Abbott's claim
that reproduction was substantially limited because an infected person
would in all likelihood not live long enough to raise a child was a pre-
sumption based on the forecasting of a future event.2 82 In rebutting this
claim, the Chief Justice pointed out that the ADA's definition of dis-
ability is only achieved when defined in the present tense.283 The Chief
Justice also noted that Abbott's argument, "taken to its logical extreme,
would render every individual with a genetic marker for some debili-
tating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some possible future
effects," 284 meaning evolving medical technology could lead to an
commonly used in the treatment of HIV. Mary Mycek et al., supra note 152, at 368-71.
276. See Mofenson supra note 272, at 569 (discussing factors, such as membrane rupture,
gestational age, maternal CD4+ lymphocyte count, birth weight, and antenatal and neonatal
zidovudine use, that affect the rate of HIV transmission from mother to child).
277. See Mofenson, supra note 272, at 569.
278. Mofenson, supra note 272, at 569. The modifiable risk factors include the long duration of
membrane rupture and the prematurity of the child. See Mofenson, supra note 272, at 560.
279. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206, 2212 (standing for the proposition that the proper year from
which to review available medical information was 1994).
280. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (stand-
ing for the proposition that the Court may re-examine a prior holding without overruling the opinion
absolutely). In Casey, for example, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a woman has a
fundamental right to seek termination her pregnancy in its early stages. See id. at 834. While the
Court did not specifically overrule its earlier holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it noted that
advancements in neonatal care altered factual assumptions up on which the earlier opinion was predi-
cated. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 858. Therefore, the Court was able to revisit the issue under a different
framework. See id.






unmanageable framework for legal analysis because the definition of
disabled would be too expansive. 285
The Bragdon Court's analysis also left open the question of
whether an individual with a disability is to be evaluated under the ADA
with or without consideration of mitigating measures. The Supreme
Court recently addressed this issue in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 286
In Sutton, twin sisters, both severely myopic, were denied employment as
global airline pilots by United Air Lines because their uncorrected vision
was less than 20/100, the airline's minimum requirement. 287 They sued,
arguing the ADA prevented the airline from discriminating against them
on the basis of their disability, severe myopia. 288 Both the district court
and the Tenth Circuit rejected their claim, finding that they were not
substantially limited from any life activity on the basis of their myopia
because they could fully correct their impairment with either glasses or
contact lenses.289
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 290 The central issue before the Court was a conflict between
the EEOC's Interpretative Guidelines and the plain language of the
ADA.291 Under the EEOC Guidelines, "The determination of whether
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made
on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 292 The EEOC Guidelines
thus call for the evaluation of an impairment or be individualized and
made without consideration of mitigating measures. 293 The plain lan-
guage of the ADA, however, asks only whether the impairment
"substantially limits a major life activity," which the lower courts in
Sutton interpreted to require consideration of mitigating measures. 294 A
285. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (standing
for the proposition that the Court may overrule the framework of a legal analysis if it finds it to be
unworkable).
286. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
287. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
288. Id. at 2143-44. "Specifically, petitioners alleged that due to their severe myopia they
actually have a substantially limiting impairment or are regarded as having such an impairment... and
are thus disabled under the Act." Id.
289. Id. at 2144 (reviewing lower court decisions). The Court further noted that the lower courts
found the plaintiffs could not support their claim that the defendant perceived the myopia as
foreclosing their ability to work generally, because the defendant only viewed it as foreclosing one
particular position, that of a global pilot. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2144-45 (discussing the EEOC guidelines).
292. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (1997)).
293. See id. at 902.
294. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 901 (10th Cir. 1997). The court wrote
that "the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance is in direct conflict with the plain language of the ADA."
Id.
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split had developed within the federal courts on this issue, with some
following the EEOC Guidelines and others rejecting them.2
95
The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, affirmed the lower courts'
decisions. 296 Framing the issue as "whether disability is to be deter-
mined with or without reference to corrective measures," 297 the Court
cited three main reasons for its decision. 298 First, it noted that the verb
"substantially limits" appears in the ADA in its present tense form,
indicating that it requires one to be "presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited . "299 Second, the Court cited
Bragdon for the premise that the ADA requires an individualized
inquiry into whether a plaintiff is disabled. 300 To hold otherwise, the
Court noted, would be to treat all plaintiffs as members of groups rather
than individuals, which it found to be "contrary to both the latter and
the spirit of the ADA."301 Finally, the Court looked to legislative
findings of the number of disabled individuals in the United States, a
number which only made sense if it did not include those whose
handicaps could be completely mitigated by corrective measures, such as
the plaintiffs in this case.302
295. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144. Before Sutton, several federal district courts and the Eighth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals followed the EEOC Guidelines and evaluated
impairments substantial limiting effects on major life activities without regard to mitigating measures.
See generally Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contract-
ing Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th
Cir. 1996); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State
Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 902-907 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp.
336, 340 (W.D. Okla. 1994). Other federal courts had decided to defer to the specific language of the
ADA and considered whether an individual's impairment actually substantially limited a major life
activity in the context of mitigating measures. See generally Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,
767-68 (6th Cir. 1997); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997);
Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997:); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F.
Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 1996); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan.
1996); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J.
Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
296. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens dissented,
joined by Justice Breyer, who also filed a dissenting opinion.
297. Id. at 2146.
298. Id. at 2146-49.
299. Id. at 2146.
300. Id. at 2147.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2147-2149.
Because it is included in the ADA's text, the finding that 43 million individuals are dis-
abled gives content to the ADA's terms, specifically the term "disability." Had Congress
intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered
by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in
the findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only




It is not clear what effect the Sutton holding will have on HIV and
AIDS claims under the ADA such as Abbott's. However, the Court's
holding that all determinations of disability for ADA purposes require
considerations of mitigating measures, together with the rule that all
ADA assessments must be individualized, for which the Court cited
Bradgon,30 3 may mean that advancing medical technology 304 would void
at least some such claims.305
C. RECENT COURT OPINIONS DEFINING PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYMENT
ISSUES AFFECTING WOMEN
Bragdon was a public accommodation case, but it is impacting ADA
employment claims as well. Following Bragdon, two recent lower court
ADA employment decisions demonstrate that courts will look very
closely at women claiming that they are disabled as a matter of law
because of impairments to their ability to reproduce.
306
First, in Berk v. Bates Advertising, USA, Inc.,307 the plaintiff sought
a motion for summary judgment holding that she was disabled as a
matter of law under Bragdon because she suffered from breast cancer.308
She was dismissed from her job because of time she took off for breast
cancer treatment and surgery; she filed suit under the ADA alleging
disability discrimination. 309 As in Bragdon, she claimed that she was dis-
abled because her impairment substantially limited her ability to
reproduce. 3 10 While the Berk court acknowledged that Bragdon was
brought under a different section of the ADA, it noted that the
definitions of disability were identical under both sections and so relied
on Bragdon in its analysis. 311
The court noted that Bragdon's decision that reproduction as a
major life activity was relevant in the instant case because doctors advised
the plaintiff that her particular type of breast cancer would pose a risk to
her life if she became pregnant. 312 She agreed to surgery to remove her
303. Id. at 2147.
304. See supra note 272.
305. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144 (holding that plaintiffs whose impairment was completely
corrected by mitigating measures was not disabled within meaning a ADA).
306. See Berk v. Bates Advertising USA, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 265, 265 (S.D. N.Y. 1998). See
also McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1017 (D. Minn. 1998). No courts have as
of yet undertaken either an expansion or restriction in the holding of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
as to the remanded direct threat issue posed from Bragdon.
307. 25 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
308. See Berk v. Bates Advertising USA, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 268.
312. See id.
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uterus and ovaries, ending her ability to reproduce. 3 13 The court held
that between the time she returned to work after surgery and when she
was terminated, she suffered an impairment that substantially limited her
ability to engage in the major life activity of reproduction. 314
Second, in McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 315 the plaintiff
brought an action against her former employer for violation of the Age
Discrimination Act, 316 the Family Leave Act, 317 the Minnesota Human
Rights Act,318 and the ADA.319 She alleged that her early menopause
constituted a disability under the ADA.320 The court dismissed the claim
that she had an impairment that significantly restricted her abilities in the
workplace. 321 While the court acknowledged that Bragdon found an
inability to have children to be a disability under the ADA,322 it refused
to read the Bragdon decision so broadly as to find that every woman
during or after menopause is disabled under the ADA.323 The court
took judicial notice of menopause, noting that it is a normal process
associated with aging. 324 Therefore, the court concluded the plaintiff
had failed as a matter of law to establish her disability claim and granted
summary judgment for the defendant on the issue. 325
The Berk and McGraw decisions demonstrate that lower courts,
while adhering to the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon, are making
individualized factual inquiries as to when reproduction is a major life
activity under the ADA.326 These decisions also demonstrate that the




314. See id. The court noted that the impairment was Bates' cancer and its accompanying pos-
sibility of return. See id. The court further noted that Berk was limited in her ability to reproduce in
two ways: "[T]he cancer made pregnancy unduly risky for Berk; and the cancer also rendered
advisable operations which would destroy any chance of reproduction." Id. at 268-69.
315. 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Minn. 1998).
316. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
317. See Family and Medical Leave Act 29 U.S.C. § 2601; 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994).
318. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1998).
319. See McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019-20 (D. Minn. 1998). The
action was brought under ADA provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. See id.




324. See id. The court continued by noting that menopause "is clearly distinguishable from early
loss or impairment of childbearing resulting from a communicable viral illness." Id.
325. See id.
326. See generally Berk, 25 F. Supp. 2d 265; McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (standing for the
proposition that lower courts are making individual factual inquires in the aftermath of Bragdon).
327. See generally McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (noting that because of the reproduction




The Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon, as well as the remand
proceedings by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, seems to have broad-
ened the scope and application of anti-discrimination legislation like the
ADA.328 However, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted, science
may advance So as to undermine the premise upon which the Court's
decision is based.329 The greatest immediate impact of the decision
should be felt by women bringing anti-discrimination claims in the
workplace because of the Bragdon Court's holding that reproduction
can constitute a major life activity under the ADA.330 Additionally,
individuals bringing state claims under state human rights provisions,
such as the North Dakota Human Rights Act, will further benefit from
the Supreme Court's broadening of ADA interpretation. 331 Therefore, it
is likely that the Supreme Court's holding in Bragdon will provide a
catalyst for continued evolution of ADA law.
James C. Parks, Jr.
3 3 2
328. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (holding that HIV infection substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction).
329. See Bragdon v. Abbott, No. 96-1643, 1998 WL 887125 (1st Cir. Dec. 29,1998).
330. See generally Berk, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 265; McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (standing for the
proposition that Bragdon seems to bear most directly upon women in employment cases claiming an
impairment that substantially limits reproduction).
331. See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 314 (8th Cir. 1997), 116 F.3d at 314
(standing for the proposition the it is likely that the North Dakota Supreme Court would construe the
NDHRA analogously with the ADA with regards to state claims by HIV-infected persons); see also
supra note 9.
332. The author would like to extend his heartfelt gratitude to Professor Marcia O'Kelly and
Kayce Compton for their patience and guidance.
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